



From Imitation to Competitive-Cooperation
Ford Foundation and Management Education 
in Western Europe (1950's-1970’s)
voi. I

























































































































































































EUI Working Paper RSC No. 97/34
Gemelli: From Imitation to Competitive-Cooperation.
Ford Foundation and Management Education 
in Western Europe (1950‘s-1970's) - vol. I
WP




























































































The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
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The many in the one, the one in the many 
(Alfred Marshall)
Nothing will be done anymore without the 
whole meddling in it.
(Paul Valery)
Introduction
In January 1937 the historian Marc Bloch gave a speech to a group of engineers, 
economists and entrepreneurs, members of the famous “X-Crise” group. His 
subject centered on the relevant question “que demander à l’histoire?” and his 
answers were impressive
“Celui qui veut s’en tenir au présent, à l’actuel” - said Bloch - “ne comprendra pas 
l’actuel. L’erreur couramment commise consiste à /../ confondre le récent et l’efficace, 
à oublier que les sociétés humaines sont douées d’une mémoire pleine de trous, parfois, 
mais aussi terriblement tenace. Les institutions, une fois créées, prennent quelque chose 
de rigide et, tenant par toutes sortes de liens à l’ensemble social, poussent de trop 
fortes racines pour pouvoir être aisément arrachées”.
This statement has relevant implications to the methodological premises of my 
work. Until a few years ago, there was a general agreement that the United States 
had always, systematically, led in the field of management education and for this 
reason, its models have been easily exported to Europe.
From the late Sixties until the early Eighties, Ford Foundation policy, in 
disseminating American patterns all over the world, contributed to strengthening 
this conviction. In a report of the Ford Foundation in 1966, the impressive title of 
which was "Management Education: A New Imperialism", Marshall Robinson, 
who at that time was officer in charge of the EDA program, stated that:
“the United States are the ideological center of the management education empire and 
some would pinpoint more specifically to the institutions located in the bank of the 
Charles river in Boston” - and that -“the Ford Foundation has been in the thick of this 
global movement”1.
This statement should be completed by mentioning the complementary role, 
played by Carnegie in the early Fifties, in developing a “new look” in American




























































































management education, with its primary emphasis on the ‘scientific’ contributions 
to the art of business administration through mathematics and the social sciences 
rather than the “clinical approach”, as at Harvard. As we shall see this 
complementarity also had some relevance in the history of the Ford Foundation’s 
European program, where the dissemination of the Harvard Business Schools’ 
approach was by far the unique path to be developed.
In his paper Robinson also stated that:
“the reasons for American leadership in this field are many, but the most important is 
the fact that we simply started before anyone else. The strength of management 
education in the United States is also heightened by the fact that our culture award 
prestige to business managers, tends to place great confidence in the educational system 
/.../ and gives less weight to family or social status as a means of deciding who its 
business leaders will be”2.
One of the specifics of American gospel in management education was that, at 
least since the mid-Sixties, it was addressed not only to Western countries but to 
Eastern countries as well.
“It would appear that the Ford Foundation is seen as one of the most acceptable 
agencies to promote /../ contacts. The Foundation's reputation in this field has spread 
East.” - Marshall Robinson observed at the European Luncheon Club in September 
1969 - “It is not only the dollars which we can provide; the East Europeans are also 
looking for the Foundation’s road map through the management education country”3.
The interaction between Western countries and Eastern European areas was the 
product of interesting and complex strategies between US cultural and political 
diplomacy and European leaders and institutional builders. Its implications were 
larger than the diffusion of management, educational and training patterns, a point 
on which I will expand upon later.
First, it is important to observe, in order to clarify the problematic framework of 
my paper, the fact that in the early Eighties, when the Ford Foundation closed all 
its programs on management education, American domination seemed well 
established in the “world-wide campus of management education”. Ten years 
later, however, the scenario has changed.
2 Ivi p.2.. A proposal was attached to this paper: Business Management Development 
Program. It was “designed to build- through management education- a stronger Atlantic 
Community capable of meeting the urgent demands of the 1970s and 1980s” and was 
conceived in three phases: 1) A survey of European business schools; 2) A policy conference; 
3) Stimulation of programs on transatlantic basis[FFA 1966, Log 233],
3 Memorandum from Marshall Robinson and Howard Swearer, Management education in 




























































































Since the late Eighties the belief in American domination has been producing 
paradoxical effects. In Eastern countries American patterns in management 
education seem to have become a real challenge, while American domination has 
become questionable in Europe.
Some authors speak of Euromangement4 5as opposed to, or at least different in 
comparison with American patterns, others following Robert Locke’s analytical 
path, stress, from a historical point of view, mechanisms of national and cultural 
resistance to American invasion. In terms of historical account the diffusion of 
management education in Europe and outside Europe reveals a number of hybrid 
situations, which are not limited to the most known cases of resistance to 
American MBA patterns, such as Germany or Japan. Even in the United States a 
recent issue of “Business History” underlines the outstanding results of some 
European business schools when compared to American ones. Moreover, the 
dominance of financial control and strategic planning functions,
“which once appeared as the solution to problems of investment, allocation and control 
in large diversified enterprises is now seen as responsible for a conception of 
management which subordinates and tends to neglect manufacturing and product 
innovation.”?
In short, a revisionist wind seems to be widespread, a “new intellectual 
orientation” whose basic ground is the revival of neglected aspects of 
“management thought” and particularly industrial engineering.
What about the methodological framework to analyze the historical roots of this 
new trend? Should one simply oppose a process of “de-Americanization” with a 
period of “Americanization”, which is now entering a phase of decline? I suspect 
that this is not the most profitable path on which to clarify the subject and that 
one should explore more unconventional conceptual tools. Similarly, from the 
historical point of view one should consider that a revisionist wind had started to 
blow since the mid-Eighties, precisely from Harvard Business Schools’ research 
groups.6 One should also recall that the pioneer of case method diffusion in 
Europe, was a Harvard Professor of Manufacturing, who in his classes never 
used the case method!!
4 See R. Calori and P. Lawrence (eds), The Business o f Europe: Managing Change
5 Peter Armstrong, The abandonment o f productive intervention in management teaching 
syllabi. A historical analysis. Warwick papers in Industrial relations Number 15, p.3.
6 See W. Skinner, Manufacturing-the Formidable Competitive Weapon, New York, John 




























































































Beginning with Marc Bloch’s statement on historical memory, 1 will try to 
consider the problem of the diffusion of the patterns of American management 
education in terms of “selective appropriation” and “cross-fertilization processes” 
in hybrid and differentiated contexts, rather than as a problem of a linear and 
mechanical transfer of patterns from one continent to another. In other words, I 
think that not only in the present but also in the past there was a permanent and 
unsolved tension between isomorphism and differentiation.
This orientation implies some basic methodological assumptions:
a) The possibility of considering “management education” not only as a subject of 
analysis but also as a detector of social and historical processes of large 
extension. Thus revealing the embedded social behaviour of institutions, and 
actors, and their mutual interaction in different social and cultural systems and in 
different periods. A cross-fertilization approach implies that, in addition to the 
rules which govern the action of the individual as socio-institutional actors, one 
should also consider, “the effects of their initial position and of all the particular 
circumstances of the immediate environment to which each of them react in the 
course of the formation of that order.”7 It implies also, that the actors’ actions 
should be considered in terms of bounded rationality, that is, as something 
different from decisions and that, the order is not given but acted,8 and acted not 
by “big decisions” but also by small and unpredictable events or phenomena. 
According to Herbert Simon the most relevant effects in cross-fertilization 
policies, should be considered in terms of “an epsilon effect”, which is at the 
same time infinitesimal and unpredictable, as far as complex systems are 
concerned and the reaction of actors and competitors is unpredictable9 ;
b) The second consequence is the necessity, in constructing discursive 
representation of cross-cultural phenomena, to distinguish between strategy as 
project and strategy as conduct, by selecting relevant elements and considering 
uncertain dimensions of the actor’s behaviour. This is especially true if one is to 
consider the Ford Foundation's history. Its policy/policies are in fact the result of 
various and not necessarily related programs and/or the presence of, at different
7 F. A. von Hayek, Rules and order, London, 1973 vol.l: Law, legislation and liberty pp.40- 
41.
8 See L. Zan, “Interactionism and systemic view in the strategic approach”, in Advances in 
Strategic Management”, vol. 12 A, 1955, pp. 277-279 who stresses the necessity to avoid 
both reductionism- when systemic features are ignored and reification when actors are 
ignored.
9 When applied to foundations’ policy this statement implies that sometimes little grants could 
produce long-term effects and that intensive communication (diffusion, impact) is more 




























































































times, different actors within the same program, and with an occasional lack of 
the implementation of previous strategic designs and conducts. Actually, Ford 
Foundation's history sometimes reveals ambivalent orientations which, 
rhetorically, could be represented as oxymorons: like universalistic -
provincialism, (an ambivalence which is not necessarily related to the functional 
distinction between International programs and domestic programs), 
comprehensive-functionalism, neutral-imperialism, scientific-activism.
The list could be continued until the oxymoron, which inspired the title of this 
paper, “competitive-cooperation” is reached. I should add that these 
ambivalences are not only the product of policy rationale within the Ford 
Foundation, which as F. Sutton shows in his paper is rather linear, but also an 
effect of actors’ interaction and relational configuration, for example the kind of 
relations between trustees and officers, or the interaction among different areas 
sharing common projects. This is especially evident in the case of European 
policy and programs, probably as a consequence of the continuing interference on 
actors’ behaviour of basic, structural conditions: European strategic proximity 
and socio-cultural distance on one side and the impossibility to reduce European 
programs’ strategy to common patterns, such as development on the other.
From this point of view, a historical study of Ford Foundation’s European 
programs appears as a wonderful field of analysis in which to explore the effects 
of “policy networks” in creating informal linkages, based on cooperation and 
trust, which overlap “with institutionalized structures of coordination, linking 
different organizations independently from the formal relations between 
them”'°and produce intentionally collective policy outcomes despite the diverging 
interest of actors.
From a more general point of view, any historical account could be provided in 
terms of linear history, whereas it is impossible, for example, to consider Ford 
Foundation’s internal history independently from its context and from their mutual 
interaction. Moreover a focus on subjective patterns (meanings) and their 
indeterminiable character should be considered in terms of relational (the attempt 
of actors to anticipate and influence the conduct of other actors) and analytical 
complexity (which means to consider interactionist approach and complex system 
analysis)." This implies a shift from an analysis of cultural and organizational 
strategies as patterns in decision-making processes, to an analysis of strategic 10
10 T. Borzel, Policy networks. A New Paradigm for European Governance. European 
University Institute, Florence, RSC Working Paper 97/19.




























































































issues as “patterns in a stream of actions”12 whose rationale is the product of a 
multiplicity of factors and of the interdependence of actors in a dynamic system. 
This consideration leads to another methodological implication, that is:
c) the necessity to emphasize specifics and differences through the 
implementation of comparative strategies, analyzing not only different national 
areas, in terms of “contrast of contexts”, but also historical periods, in terms of 
selecting “events” which become crucial in order to analyze the logic of historical 
change (phases of continuity and discontinuity).
More specifically, in the field I am exploring, Ford Foundation’s long period of 
involvement in management education demands the introduction of many 
analytical factors, as detectors of changing situations, in order to identify the logic 
of historical change, related to relevant (structural) “events”. These factors 
concern strategic and structural phenomena such as the creation of the European 
Common Market and its political and cultural effects, especially between the late 
Fifties and the mid-Seventies, and the impact of economic crisis in the mid- 
Seventies in management development, especially at the level of multinational 
corporations. They concern also more punctual “events”, such as for example, the 
shift from the debate on the technological gap towards the debate on the 
managerial gap in 1967, which emerged as a consequence of a statement 
simultaneously made by a leading Ford Foundation Trustee, Robert Me. Namara, 
in a famous speech, and a prominent French journalist, J. J. Servan Schreiber, in a 
famous book.
Actually one of the most relevant “structural events” in management education 
development and strategies is the conflict between East-West (an “event” which 
is in itself an enormous field of inquiry). In the preliminary proposal for the 
European Management Development Program, on the basis of the Atlantic 
Council Report, it was clearly stated that
“if we are to augment the strength and growth of the Free World /.../ then it is 
imperative that on both sides of the Atlantic we explore the opportunities for improved 
education in multinational business management”.
Strategically, since the mid-Sixties, in particular but also before, management 
education became a crucial enjeu in more than one field. Following the 
conceptual approach of negotiation studies, one should point out that the main 
effect of those programs was to produce “an additional value to be shared” in a
12 H. Mitzemberg and J.A. Waters, “Does decision get in the way?”, Organisational Studies, 
XI, 1990, pp. 1-6, and also M. Crozier and E. Friedberg, V acteur et le système. Les 




























































































complex process of interaction among unequal partners whose basic framework, 
goals and issues had more than one core. The enormous amount of studies on 
Americanisms and Americanization which have been carried out, stress the 
integration of ideology and power which is implied in these concepts.
What I would like to analyze is the production of "cooperation", and its 
embedded effects as an additional factor, which is, in my perspective a strategic 
additional value13. Was it the product of a linear and cumulative history, or should 
one reconsider this history by analyzing different phases in which management 
education played a diverse strategic role with different actors and through various 
factors?
Let us start from the beginning, that is from the pioneer and experimental phase 
which had an important role in some European countries. The background of my 
analysis is based on some preliminary considerations: first, one should observe 
that management education was certainly a relevant goal in Area III, EDA 
(Economic Development and Administration), but in the early Fifties this 
centrality was limited to the US, whereas outside the country, management 
education was not considered a strategic sector. Generally speaking in the context 
of European economic policies, the Ford Foundation was a special actor but not a 
unique one. Plus until the late Fifties, the interest of trustees in European 
programs was variable and sometimes ambiguous, Francis Sutton demonstrates 
this in his paper. Then thanks to the pressures of Shepard Stone and Joseph Slater 
a European program was finally started.
The core of Ford Foundation’s policy in Europe was much more related to the 
implementation of European-American diplomatic and strategic relations, 
especially in direction of Germany, after the signature of the Schuman Plan, as it 
was clearly stated in the reports concerning the creation and the activity of ACUE 
(American Committee on United Europe). ACUE’s main goal, according to its 
Chairman, William J. Donovan, was “seeking strong allies rather than amenable 
satellites”. As it is known ACUE, which had the strong support of leading 
personalities like Jean Monnet and G. Ball, developed a research project on 
federalism and its possible strategies in Europe. The research staff was largely 
drawn from Harvard Law School and in particular scholars who since World War 
II had great experience in European politics, constitutional and legal policies. 
Considering the role played by Harvard Business School in management 
education’s cross-fertilisation policies one should not forget that it was part of a 
more general orientation.




























































































Since World War II different faculties of Harvard University have had a central 
role in organizing national war effort and in transforming scholarly work in 
applied research. Moreover one should also consider that even in the United 
States “nothing preordinated the rise of graduate management education in the 
post-war years” but many simultaneous and independent factors contributed to its 
rapid growth: the development of operational research, the strong will of a cohort 
of wartime economists “to expand the reach of quantitative analysis in their post­
war research” and, last but not least, the fact that the Ford Foundation hired 
Rowan Gaither (who had just finished organising the Rand Corporation).
Thanks to the advisorship of bright young experts like Leland Bach, Gaither 
developed the idea that “the Ford Foundation could contribute to enhancing US 
national security by improving the managerial capacities of both private firms and 
public agencies”14.
What I want to stress is that the origins of European programs in management 
training are not the simple and linear effects of exporting the “American design” 
outside the country, but a series of multiple paths, and “scattered” experiments in 
which main actors, Harvard Business School and the Ford Foundation, 
participated with different goals, negotiating their mutual role in each experiment.
14 Robert E. Gleeson and Steven Schlossmann, Georges Leland Bach and the Rebirth of 





























































































TRANSFER OF PATTERNS 
1952-1965 
Americanisation
The “promised land”: Harvard’s Expansion to Europe in the Early Fifties.
The pioneer phase of the dissemination of Harvard Business School’s educational 
patterns in Europe started in the early Thirties and was related to the role played 
by outstanding figures like General Georges F. Doriot, a French bom and 
American trained Harvard Business School professor of Manufacturing. Thanks 
to Doriot’s personal initiative and intensive contacts with French entrepreneurial 
and institutional milieu, rather than as an official requirement of Harvard Business 
School’s deanship, the CPA (Centre de préparation aux affaires), was created in 
Paris. The CPA was created with the organisational support of the Chamber of 
Commerce and the agreement of many important industrialists like Raoul de Vitry 
of Pechiney which was one of the first French firms to employ, since the inter­
war period, American consultants. I have extensively analyzed Doriot’s role and 
the origins of CPA in some published articles15. Here I will only stress the 
continuity of his role in Europe and in particular the fact that during the crucial 
period of Ford Foundation’s involvement in European management education 
programs, Doriot had strong contacts with the Foundation’s board of Trustees. 
From this point of view he should be considered as an integral actor in many of 
the projects in this field of analysis. However, it is evident that the role which he 
chiefly played was that of an isolated innovator.
Harvard Business School and its teaching staff only began to play an official role 
in cross-fertilization dynamics in the early Fifties. Relevant factors were the 
development of the overseas program followed by the nomination, in 1953, of the 
Assistant Dean John B. Fox as Director of the Eishenower Exchange Fellowships 
Program. Despite initial negative expectations, this program was a factor which 
motivated Harvard professors’ visiting fellowships, as well as the cooperation 
between Harvard Business School and the Ford Foundation.
At the origins of the pioneer stage there was, without doubt Ford Foundation’s 
interest in developing strategic relationships in economic and cultural programs in 
the Near East and progressively, with the development of the productivity 
programs also in Europe. A crucial point of intersection of these two “lines”, (the
15 G. Gemelli, “Per una storia comparata delle business schools in Europa. Le origini 




























































































Ford Foundation’s and Harvard Business School’s overseas policies), from the 
point of view of “actors”, is related to the role of Harvard Business School’s 
Dean, Donald D. David in the early Fifties as a trustee of the Ford Foundation 
and to the continuity of interest which different experts, within Harvard Business 
School’s overseas activities, developed by continuing the kind of policy 
“investment” made by their predecessors. It is well known that Dean David 
played along with Thomas Carroll a crucial role in developing the “new look” in 
management education in the most prominent American business schools. He was 
also one of the pioneers of Harvard expansion to Europe, in cooperation with 
John Fox and R. Christensen, (rather than with Carroll, who was not a strong 
supporter of Ford Foundation’s European programs).
The role of these pioneer experiments was acknowledged some years later by A. 
Towl when the program of dissemination of the case method in Europe became a 
systemic project, under the organizational framework of the Ford Foundation.
“As my colleagues and I began inquiries in different countries for cases” - Towl wrote - 
“it soon became apparent that case development and the use of cases had been long and 
strongly influenced by vigorous pioneers.”16
The role of Harvard’s expansion in Europe was progressively emphasized by the 
development of productivity strategies, (which should be analyzed as a basic 
framework in developing management education in Europe), and by the fact that 
these strategies were supported, during the years of the Marshall plan especially 
in some countries like UK and Italy, by American government campaigns “to 
persuade that management education was a condition of economic growth.”17 As 
one shall see this impact did not happen without resistance, but indeed with a 
resistance different in scale and patterns.
First of all one should note that in the early Fifties Harvard Business School’s 
overseas programs, as well as the activity of the EDA program of the Ford 
Foundation, were not uniquely directed towards European countries. At this time 
even the concept of European identity was only in its developing phase.
In the early Fifties a relevant concept was that of a Mediterranean area, which 
included Italy and Greece as well as some countries of the near East, like Turkey.
16 Andrew Towl, A Note o f Appreciation to Participants in a collective effort, FFA Reel No. 
1542, Grant No. 71197, Section 1.
17 N. Tiratsoo, “What you need is a Harvard, American and British Management Education cir. 
1945-1965 in T. Gourvish, N. Tiratsoo, Americanisation and its Limits, (forthcoming, 
Manchester University Press). See also G. Gemelli, International Strategies and National 




























































































In what concerns management education one of the first and well documented 
experiments was the attempt to introduce management education in Turkey, 
which despite its irregular development should not be considered as a failure, 
especially from the point of view of its level of interaction with parallel 
experiments in Europe. Significantly through some of the actors involved in this 
project, the Turkish experiment (which extended, with various grants and 
patterns, from 1954 until the early Seventies, with a total financial support of 
$1,005,000), crossed the Italian experiment of IPSOA, which in terms of the size 
of the grant should be considered as a “peripheric” project. In fact, Harvard 
financed the development of IPSOA’s faculty through a Ford Foundation grant of 
$13,000.
I have written extensively on this last case study 18 in two recent articles, where I 
have tried to show that despite the small size of the grant, and the institutional 
failure of IPSOA, the experiment had important effects in the long period. I would 
like to stress here, only some elements which seem to be useful in order to make 
comparative considerations. What Turkey and Italy had in common, despite a 
very different political, cultural and economic environment, was the perspective 
of a rapid economic growth which demanded to be supported by an equally rapid 
transformation of social and educational patterns. One of the crucial elements in 
the picture was the lack of relations between the university system and the 
business community. However, this lack was not a peculiarity of Turkey and Italy 
but also of more developed industrial countries, especially England where 
management education was slow to develop but for reasons which were different 
from what was going on in Turkey and Italy. In England, despite the creation in 
1948 of the British Institute of Management, and the strong incentives given by 
managers/intellectuals, like Lyndal Urwick, and the role played by the Anglo- 
American Productivity Council, the first business schools were only established 
in the 1960’s.
However, despite the attempt of the Americans to create a British Harvard, the 
Harvard Business School was not really at work in England as it was in Turkey 
and Italy due to the Ford Foundation’s program support. In the Italian and 
Turkish case, the effect of the introduction of business education’s curricula 
presented similarities but also strong differences. These similarities and 
differences produced for the actors involved in both programs, an increasing 
consciousness of the constraints which the “environment” could have in the 
diffusion of the case method approach.
18 G. Gemelli, “Un esperimento in vitro: l’IPSOA di Torino (1952-1964)”, in G. Gemelli (ed.), 




























































































The most relevant similarity is that of the program’s by-products. In both 
countries, for different reasons, the possibility to integrate management 
intellectuals and experts within the academic system was very limited. In the case 
of IPSOA, (which was created outside the university), this constraint could be 
represented as its isolating factor - perhaps a golden isolation - within the “Torino 
system” which was based on a strong network, including the Politecnico, the 
faculty of Economics’ professors, and Fiat high quarters (Valletta), all under the 
same flag, (an authoritarian and antidemocratic style), which dominated both the 
factory and the academic system.
In Turkey the initiators of the Istanbul Institute of Business Administration had 
hoped that the participation of business leaders would lead to a curriculum based 
on both theory and practice. "This proved to be an illusion"- said Robert W. 
Kerwin, a graduate from Johns Hopkins University with a dissertation on Etatism 
and the Industrialisation o f Turkey, (who also worked as a consultant of the Ford 
Foundation). The Board of Directors had little to do with the curriculum, this was 
the province of the academic staff. Attempts to recruit businessmen as teaching 
staff were generally unsuccessful.
In fact, as the IIBA developed during the period 1954-60, the business 
participants became somewhat disillusioned with the project. They criticized the 
MBA courses as being too theoretical and insufficiently oriented to Turkish 
business problems and practices.” 19 It is interesting to observe that this negative 
impact in Turkey had similar consequences in Italy, related however to opposite 
behaviour of the business élites. In Italy, because of the resistance of companies 
and firms to introduce IPSOA’s graduates within the “system”, many of them 
were “compelled” to become consultants, that is, in most cases to invent a “new 
profession” by creating their own consulting firms. In Turkey the business elite 
was sufficiently compact to stimulate an adaptation of Ford Foundation’s 
programs to the Turkish context.
As their disillusionment with university management education grew, some of the 
businessmen, who had been active in the development of the Institute of Business 
Administration at Istanbul University, turned to the idea of establishing a non­
profit professional management organisation as a means of providing more 
practical and functional training at the post-experience level outside the 
Universities. The TMA (Turkish Management Association) was founded in
Overseas Programs: Italy and Turkey





























































































Istanbul in 1962 by business leaders “following some two years of discussion of a 
non-university approach to management development”.
TMA had an important role in the internationalisation of the Turkish business 
community
“One of the foreign organisations contacted at the CECIOS meeting which had 
volunteered to send specialists to Turkey to help organise ad hoc training programs for 
the TMA, was the Rastor Corporation of Finland, a consulting company that evolved 
from the establishment of a national professional management association in the 
country. Based on their own experience, the Rastor people recommended that the 
TMA develop a consultancy service for Turkish industry as a means of training 
practising managers on the job and helping them to solve their growing problems in the 
area of production financing and accounting, marketing and personnel management /../. 
Basic to the TMA’s consultancy/training project was the opportunity for the 
professional association, as a private, non profit organisation, to recruit as staff- 
consultants experienced mangers from industry at salary levels competitive with private 
sectors pay-scales”20.
The consultancy/training project was given the name of the Turkish Management 
Development Center (TMCD) which rapidly developed, through a special Ford 
Foundation grant, large contacts with the activities of management organisations 
in Finland, Sweden, Belgium, England and France.
‘The TMA group was highly impressed during its visit to England, with training 
possibilities for English speaking Turks at the Urwick Management Center. In fact 
Urwick-Orr and Partners, the British consulting firms that operated the UMC, was 
considered a model on which a Turkish consultancy/training organisation might be 
based.”21
Since the mid-Sixties the TMA became instrumental in launching a new approach 
to generating business and industry support for University business schools 
through the creation of a Turkish Management Education Foundation in 1967, 
(the Ford Foundation contributed to the creation of this institution with a grant of 
$30,000).
At this time the models to imitate were the Fondation Industrie Université in 
Belgium and the Foundation for Management Education in England. Despite large 
investments made through EPA’s programs in training young teachers who were 
sent to the US (a large number of which had graduated from IPSOA), in Italy 






























































































la Produttività and IPSOA.22 At the same time the business community was 
totally deaf to the gospel of management training, or, as was the case for Valletta, 
supported the idea only in an instrumental way, Valletta’s strategy was to “get 
American money” to improve FIAT’s own business.
The positive impact of the case-method approach on the young generation of 
IPSOA students, in comparison to what happened in the same years in the 
Turkish context, created paradoxically a constraint, because it gave the false 
impression that American methods could easily be disseminated in the Italian 
context. IPSOA then became a kind of island without an “arcipelago”, an 
institutional “enclosure” within the Italian educational system which was unable 
to change and resisted new cultural and training patterns, maintaining its 
character of an academic citadel, centered on theoretical learning and ex-cathedra 
teaching.23 Until the late Seventies, innovation was a product of rather 
uncoordinated activities of dissemination, that is of individual initiatives taken 
mostly by an intellectual Diaspora, (a typical epsilon effect), rather than a product 
of organisational strategies supported by an institutional design. Moreover IPSOA 
started its “long whimper”, a phase of decline, exactly when management 
education was entering a phase of coordinated and extensive development at the 
European level.
Paradoxically in the long period from the Fifties to the early Seventies changes 
were more relevant in the Turkish case than in Italy, particularly concerning 
attitudes and behaviour of business leaders towards management development. At 
first a graduate business school was thought to be the answer to all management 
development needs, both immediate and future. Then, a non university approach 
was thought to be the answer, but this also proved difficult to organise 
effectively.
When a consultancy input was introduced, management training became more on- 
the-job oriented, but then a return was made towards a partially academic 
approach by the demand for a residential training center coupled with on the-job 
application.”24 Consequently, the Turkish experience shows that the best 
management education and training involves a careful balance between a 
theoretical and practical approach. It also shows the crucial role of non-profit 
institutions at the international level, not only because the Ford Foundation was
22 G. Gemelli, “International strategies and National issues. CNP and its networks” in T. 
Gourvish and N. Tiratsoo Americanisation and its limits, (forthcoming).
23 G. Gemelli, Un esperimento in vitro l’IPSOA di Torino (1952-1965) in G. Gemelli (ed.), Lo 
sviluppo delle business schools.




























































































active in all stages of the Turkish experiment, but also thanks to the pertinent role 
played at the national level, by the TMDC.
From the point of view of the American actors it is evident that in both cases, in 
Italy as well as in Turkey, the dominant pattern was “learning by doing”, 
sometimes by developing comparative analysis. Documents related to this pioneer 
phase contain details on the activity of Harvard professors who participated to 
both of the programs, (the Istanbul Institute and IPSOA, Turin). An example of 
one such professor is, Pearson Hunt, a professor of Finance at Harvard, who tried 
to create a permanent faculty with a Harvard style at IPSOA and as an 
Eisenhower fellow travelled to the Istanbul Schools of Business Administration. 
In a letter to Kenneth H. Iverson, Near East Representative of the Ford 
Foundation, Hunt observed:
“Although I came more in the role of a visitor than a faculty member, I soon found 
myself involved in a complex crisis. Morale was lower than in any other organisation 
I’ve seen and as usual in such circumstances every one was blaming over every one 
else. To a certain extent I was reminded of IPSOA, because a large part of the troubles 
comes from the old Economics Faculty’s honest (?) convictions that the new courses 
aren’t academically useful”.
Hunt stresses two important factors in developing management education 
strategies. First, the necessity to create “independent” schools, that is not 
necessarily separate from the university but based on “relationships /../ free 
enough to allow experiment to be worked out to their conclusion in a reasonably 
helpful environment”.
The second condition was the creation of a full-time faculty:
“I have been given new evidence”- Hunt wrote -“of the wisdom of Ing. Enriques at 
IPSOA who insisted when we arrived in 1953 that for the first three months there 
should be no interruptions in the full-time work of the staff /../ A habit of attendance 
and work was established that lasted quite a while.” 25
While comparing the relative facility in diffusing the case method approach in 
Italy with the difficulties of the Istanbul Institute, Hunt and a few others (but 
certainly not all the American experts, as one shall see) developed the feeling that 
the resistance came from incorporated patterns. Patterns such as in the case of
25 P. Hunt Letter to Kenneth R. Iverson, June 11, 1958 [Ford Foundation Archive FFA, Reel 




























































































Turkey the fact that “when they started developing their educational system, they 
came under the influence of the French and German systems first.”26
For some of the observers the “promised land” for Harvard’s expansion was not 
an undifferentiated continent but a system of selected islands. It should be 
mentioned at this point that, since 1954 an effort was made to put in contact the 
representatives of different experimental schools which were part of HBS 
overseas program and had adopted the case method approach. According to a 
memorandum sent from the Istanbul school’s American representatives to Iverson 
(one of the member of the special survey team sent in 1952 by the Ford 
Foundation to investigate the needs and program possibilities of countries in the 
Near East), “the Torino group”, that is Hunt and Wachsmann, were the promoters 
of the initiative.27 In the Italian case Harvard Business School had really a central 
and dominant role. As we have seen this was not the case in the Turkish 
experiment which developed a multi-donor strategy.
It is also interesting to observe that Harvard Business School and the Ford 
Foundation were not two inseparable partners. Harvard Business School and 
Ford, in fact, tried to develop the above mentioned strategic factors (commitment 
and stabilization of Business schools faculties and the development of dynamic 
relations between university system and business schools), through independent 
paths and programs. Since 1958, that is when the living experience of IPSOA was 
entering a phase of crisis in Turin, Harvard Business School strongly supported, 
without Ford Foundation grants, the creation of a permanent faculty at IMEDE in 
Switzerland.
In a recent letter I received from P. Hunt there are some interesting comments on 
this point:
“It’s not a detail to say that Dean David shifted his support /from IPSOA/ to IMEDE. 
The shift was dramatic. For IPSOA he was ready to accept the request for one Harvard 
Business Faculty member. It was made clear to me, for instance, that I would have to 
find colleagues from other schools /../ When it came to IMEDE, the Dean chose five 
HBS Professors and sent them to Lausanne all at one. This kind of staffing continued 
for several years. It is the difference between consent and strong initiative. I am sure in 
my own mind that a site in Switzerland (Holland was also considered) had higher status 
in the minds of the Dean and his advisors than a site in an industrial site in Italy”28
26 Richard D. Robinson, Memorandum to Walter S. Rogers: "In Turkey for the Ford 
Foundation or Random Thought on Economic Development”[FFA Reel, n° 5971, Grant n. 
54, section 3].
27 Robert E. Stone, Letter to Kenneth R. Iverson, John B. Fox and Robert E. Culberton March 
26, 1954.[FFA, Reel n. 5971, Grant n° 54, Section 3, p. 3],




























































































It is however interesting to observe that, Harvard professors started to rapidly 
consider the IMEDE experience as a kind of exceptional result of Harvard 
Business School foreign policy. In April 1958 the American co-director of the 
Istanbul school, R. Stone (who had resigned as Dean of the College of Business 
Administration of Syracuse to accept an appointment as professor of Business 
Administration at Harvard Business School and to serve as American co-director 
at the Istanbul Institute), sent a letter to his Turkish colleague Sabri Ulgener, the 
subject of which was IMEDE institutional philosophy and pedagogical system as 
an example to be imitated by the Turkish Faculty! No mention was made of the 
differences of culture and industrial context in Turkey and in Switzerland.29 I 
suspect that this rather abstract behaviour of the American experts should be 
included as one of the factors which negatively influenced the first stage of 
Turkish experiment.
29 Robert E. Stone, Memorandum to Sabri F. Ulgener, April 30, 1958 [FFA Reel 5971, Grant 





























































































The Belgian Experiment: Innovative Organisation
The implementation of the second factor mentioned by Hunt, "independence" of 
experimental schools in a context of interactive cooperation between the 
academic system and the business community, was really only at work in 
Belgium, this time with Ford Foundation’s direct initiative and the participation of 
a good number of American Schools of management, and not only Harvard 
Business School. Gaston Deurinck, an engineer with a degree in philosophy, was 
the young and energetic builder of the Belgian Productivity Committee. He was 
one of the few European intellectual managers to clearly perceive that in order to 
activate new educational strategies it was first of all necessary to produce the 
right environment, by transforming personal affinities and informal synergy's 
between business leaders and academic milieu in constructive and progressively 
“autopoietic” networks. His idea of strengthening this network through the 
Fondation Industrie Université, as a strategic complement to the activity of BCP 
is synthetically and clearly resumed in a Memorandum of L.A. Bekaert, 
(President of the Federation of Belgian Industries):
“After a long period of preliminary survey” -Bekaert wrote- “the Federation of Belgian 
Industries has set up in 1954 a committee for training and improvement of business 
management. This committee was instructed to determine, by the light of what has been 
done abroad, the best way for training of managers to proceed. First of all the 
committee examined the realizations already performed by the Belgian Productivity 
Center, which from 1953 had sketched the skeleton of an inter-university program for 
business management. As soon as the principles /../ had been laid down the committee 
selected a smaller group of its members to deal with specifying the modalities of 
application. This was done for the first time, at the Knoccke colloquium in 1955, which 
brought about the necessity of an entire cooperation to be given to the extent and 
development of the university program. The broadening of cooperation, the 
coordination of the several efforts on a nation-wide scale required however the creation 
of a Foundation /which/ must be a guarantee that enterprise managers will grant full 
attention to the training of executives”30
Thus the Fondation Industrie-Université was created in February 1956. Its board 
represented, to the largest possible extent, the idea of cooperation among 
educational functions and economic sectors, according to specific socio-economic 
patterns which have characterised Belgian society since the inter-war period. 
Cooperation not only concerned university professors and the representatives of 
different economic sectors but also the representatives of the different regions of 
the country. The New Foundation was supported by a Ford Foundation grant of




























































































$50,000, which was not quantitatively a conspicuous grant but certainly came at 
the right moment.
The perception of the strategic role that the Belgian Foundation could play came, 
notably not from within the Ford Foundation but from a very influential pressure 
group, specifically from John Ferguson, one of the partners of an international 
law firm, which included George Ball (Clery, Gottlieb, Freindly & Ball). In a 
letter of December 1955 addressed to Shepard Stone, Ferguson stressed the 
necessity to coordinate Stone’s idea of strengthening management training 
programs through a special program undertaken by the European Productivity 
Agency and Deurinck’s idea of an experimental program centered on Belgian 
managers in order to test its efficacy, with a view to expanding it slowly in the 
future.
“Deurinck believes,”- Ferguson wrote- “and I agree with him, that it would be a 
mistake to send a sizeable group of trainers to one university where they would be 
treated as a European group and isolated from their American counterparts. It seems to 
me that it would be better to distribute them among several universities, where each 
would take his place in an existing program / . . /1 certainly agree that it would be useful 
for the Ford Foundation to support projects of an international and inter-European 
character/../ however, I do not feel that this approach should exclude national project, 
particularly when they provide you with experience useful in a later international 
programs”. 31
This document contains some interesting elements of reflection. It reveals that the 
basic framework for the development of management education’s European 
programs was not located in Area III but rather in the Area I of Ford Foundation 
activities including International Affairs and International Training and Research. 
Moreover it reveals the existence, since the mid-Fifties of new actors who shared 
the feeling of the increasing strategic role of management training, that is the 
Fondation Industrie-Université, whose action, as we shall see later, in the long 
term had a crucial role in strengthening Brussels’ centrality as a pole of 
cooperation strategies and the European Productivity Agency, which had existed 
since 1953 but developed a systematic program in management training only after 
1955.
In March 1955 a group of experts from ten European countries arrived in New 
York for a period of two months, during which they visited many leading 
business schools, consulting agencies and industrial firms around the country in 
order to study the possibility to diffuse methods and organisational patterns of
31 John H. Ferguson, Letter to Shepard Stone, December 14, 1955, p. 2 [FFA, Reel 0068, 




























































































executive training in Europe. The group was composed of 23 outstanding 
personalities coming from different sectors of society (universities, business, 
bureaucracy). The project and its program had been outlined two years previous, 
after EPA's official creation. It was inspired by the necessity to develop the 
recommendations of an international conference which had been held in Henley- 
on-Thames in September 1953. The project was produced by EPA in April 1954 
as project no. 229 and the results of the study group were discussed in June 1955 
at the Chateau de la Muette.
The Role of the European Productivity Agency
This initiative was not part of a systematic plan to develop management 
education. Until the mid-Fifties, management training was just one of manifold 
initiatives supported by the Agency during its "experimental" phase. Actually 
1955-56 was a crucial period in EPA’s development. Even if organisational 
changes were formally ratified only in 1957, the intensification of programs in 
management education was a product of the mid-Fifties. EPA's formal decision of 
changing its organisational patterns, had been prepared by a crucial change 
concerning its leadership and decision making orientation which permitted a 
strategic choice among the outlined programs.
The first step in this direction was the resignation of Karl Harten (who had been 
chosen by the American O.E.C.E.’s representatives) from the position of EPA 
director in 1955. He was replaced by a French Conseiller d'Etat, Roger Grégoire, 
who had good relations and developed a positive cooperation with Alexander 
King, the pioneer of productivity gospel, as well as with the founder of CPA in 
Paris, General Georges F. Doriot, who at that time was launching the idea of 
creating an European business school in Paris.
Until the end of 1956 as director of the PRA committee, King was a kind of 
ideas’ man in EPA' activities, based on the perception of the necessity of,
aiding a cultural transition into a new kind of society where the ultimate sciences, 
natural, social and economics will live in harmony and an interdisciplinary approach 
would be taken in a general holistic context, and this is for example the evolution of 
training into education, the destruction of pure ivory towers bringing practical and 
theoretical concepts together, and industry more responsible 32
In November 1956 he finally obtained an official and prestigious position when 
he took the place of Flechner as Vice-director of EPA. King was the true catalyst




























































































of the Agency institutional bodies and sectors as well as of its strategic aims, 
being at the same time “a man with a vision” and an outstanding scholar in 
applied research, as well as one the few experts in administration of science. King 
attended the Royal School of Sciences in London and became assistant of Sir 
Henry Tizard, who during World War I transformed the administration of science 
into a strategic weapon at the service of the British Government.
After teaching at the Imperial College of Science in 1942 he became Scientific 
advisor to the Ministry of production and from 1943-47 head of the scientific 
mission of the United Kingdom to the Washington Embassy.
One of the first operations conducted by the team Grégoire and King was a one 
month trip in November-December 1955, to the United States the report of 
which, is a very illuminating one. The main goals of the trip were:
"examiner avec les autorités des Etats Unis les problèmes que posent à l'avenir 
l'existence, le financement et le fonctionnement de l'Agence; rechercher dans quelle 
mesure les fondations américaines seraient prêtes à participer à certains projets de 
l'AEP pour lesquels elles avaient déjà témoigné de l'intérêt; visiter un certain nombre 
d'écoles d'administration des entreprises organisées dans les universités américaines, 
examiner les conceptions américaines modernes sur ce genre d'enseignement, en 
raison notamment de la décison récente de créer à l'AEP un groupe spécialisé dans 
cette question.” 33
As we shall see these three goals were focused towards a dominant issue, the 
professionalisation of management through research.
"On insiste partout”- King and Grégoire wrote- "sur la nécessité de poursuivre les 
recherches dans le domaine de l'Administration des entreprises et sur le fait que le 
progrès des connaissances doit précéder le progrès de l'enseignement. Comme l'Europe 
s'intéresse beaucoup à ces problèmes et comme l'enseignement de la gestion des affaires 
n'a pas encore intégralement droit de cité dans les Universités européennes /../ l'Europe 
doit suivre avec particulièrement d'attention les dernières expériences américaines dans 
ce domaine /../ et donner moins d’importance aux réalisations des écoles traditionnelles, 
même celles qui ont eu un certain succès” 34
King considered with interest the most recent experiences of introducing a “new 
look” within the curricula of the leading American business school based on the 
incorporation of the behavioural and social sciences inside a traditional set of 
disciplines, such as accounting, mathematics and econometrics.
33 A.S.C., R.G. : C.N.P., Box 70. 81.1., Fold.; AEP Documentazione, M.A. King, M. R. 
Grégoire Rapport sur leur mission aux Etats-Unis ( 14 novembre- 13 décembre 1955), pp.l- 
2.




























































































As mentioned above the Ford Foundation had been since the early Fifties the 
main actor in this relevant change. Moreover, in the second half of the Fifties the 
Foundation launched two other programs which strengthened the visibility of the 
“new look” in several disciplinary contexts and outside the US. In 1958 the 
foundation started a program whose aim was to transform management into an 
applied social science.
The leading scholars of this project, a highly interdisciplinary one, were three 
outstanding experts in different fields of social science; the political scientist 
Robert Dahl, the psychologist Maison Haire and the sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld, 
who developed a special project to implement the application in the social science 
field of Harvard’s case method approach. The general aim of the project was,
"to indicate to other researchers in their own discipline the challenge of research in 
problems dealing with the business community and to indicate to persons on the staff 
of business schools how the techniques and theoretical structure of the basic 
disciplines /../ applies to the traditional areas of marketing, organisation and 
administration".33
In the following years Lazarsfeld addressed to the Ford Foundation a proposal 
“for relating Harvard Business School cases to the social sciences”. Another 
proposal was made through the BASR of the Columbia University and was 
related to “designing a study of the effects of business school training on business 
careers". 35
35 EDA, Planning memorandum FFA Reel 0119, grant n° 509.304 Section 3 See also Thomas 
H. Carrol “Foreword”: in R. Dahl, M. Haire and P. F. Lazarsfeld, Social Science Research in 
Business. Product and Potential, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959 "Since its 
inception in 1954, the Ford foundation's Program in Economic Development and 
Administration has had as one of its major interests the support of promising developments in 
higher education for business. Fruitful developments have occurred recently in the application 
of methodology and analysis from the social sciences, psychology and sociology, to the study 
of business problems. To stimulate the increased interest in the world of business as a subject 
for research by social scientists, and to encourage a greater appreciation on the part of faculty 
members in business administration of the potential contribution these underlying disciplines 
offer, the foundation initiated a special, multi-phase program in 1958. In one phase of this 
program ten outstanding professors in graduate faculties of sociology, psychology and 
political science, whose research interests are oriented towards problems of business, were 
granted "master fellowships" /.../ In a second phase of this program, fellowships have been 
established to enable a selected number of business administration faculty members to spend a 
full year pursuing a self-defined course of study in the social sciences (other than economics, 
statistics and mathematics) /../ A third phase /../ has made three-year visiting professorships in 
the social sciences, applied mathematics and statistics available to five selected schools of 





























































































Significantly, the development of these projects occurred in the period of 
intensification of Lazarsfeld’s trip to Europe, especially in France, where he acted 
as a leading scholar in the UNESCO project on “Main Trends in the Social 
Sciences” and, in the mid-sixties, tried to create, within the new project of the 
Maison des Sceinces de 1’Homme, a research laboratory with the :::ime 
orientation of the BASR16.
The second relevant event was the publication in 1959 of the Gordon and Howell 
report on US management education, which the Foundation inspired in order to 
study the effects of the organisational change produced by its programs, the 
report was largely discussed in Europe. The effect of rationalisation, produced by 
EPA’s policy through its different programs in management education and 
training of productivity experts was certainly a relevant factor in stimulating this 
interest.
It is important to observe the particular use which King made of the reference to 
the organisational change introduced by the Ford Foundation, in order to stress 
the necessity of implementing the basically technical set of recipes of productivity 
with a large cultural background which was firmly rooted in European tradition.
King wrote in 1956 that,
'There is a reluctance on the part of Universities in some part of Europe to accept 
management as a subject of sufficient intellectual content for inclusion alongside the 
accepted disciplines. This has been supported by the tendency since the war /../ to 
introduce the subject in the form of particular techniques, sometimes trivial, apparently 
unconnected with each other and often without consideration of underlying principles. 
At the same time there is recognition of the need for well trained, progressive managers 
in European industry /../. It appears to us that accepted American methods of training 
for management, while developed more extensively and successfully than elsewhere, 
have tended to become somewhat traditional. On the other hand, the growing needs 
and complexities of industry are clearly making it necessary to develop managers of a 
new type, while the elaboration of scientific methods and the unfolding of the social 
sciences are offering new and dramatic possibilities"* 37.
16 For a more detailed account of Lazarsfeld’s role in developing social research in Europe and 
particularly in France see G. Gemelli, “Paul Lazarsfeld et la France au milieu des années 
soixante”, in Bernard P. Lecuyer, Paul F. Lazarsfeld. Sa vie. Son oeuvre. Paris, L’Harmattan 
(forthcoming)
37 A. King, Studies on Management Organisation in Various European Countries, EPA, 




























































































This statement contains a clear agreement on the basic elements which inspired 
the "new look" of the Ford Foundation as a positive opportunity to develop 
European management education. It should be stressed that among the European 
experts there was a largely shared opinion: European management ought to be 
built on a large cultural and cross-disciplinary base, integrating the American 
patterns with the European transnational culture. As Alexander King pointed out, 
this interdisciplinary orientation should be based on an increasing use of 
quantitative methods and mathematical analysis, like for example, the theory of 
games, on the scientific method and operational research techniques as well as on 
the implementation of social and behavioural sciences research tradition.
Thus it is interesting to follow the dynamics of the interaction between EPA’s 
officials and Ford Foundation officers, particularly through Joseph Slater’s 
general correspondence, during a period in which, after the decision of ICA to 
reduce its contribution to EPA from $1,5 million to $1,1 million, Ford 
Foundation’s grants to EPA were negotiated.
On one side was EPA’s project of training European managers which emphasized 
and strengthened links with Harvard Business School. In particular, after 1958, 
when the Harvard School started the International Teachers Program, which 
became a crucial instrument in the diffusion of the case method approach. EPA’s 
long courses programs (9-12 months), for prospective or junior management 
teachers who would then specialize in a particular subject matter of Business 
Administration, j« were normally part of the International Teachers Program, 
whose “design” was produced with the cooperation of Harvard’s professors who 
took part to the overseas program of the school in the early Fifties (Fox, Hunt).
On another side, however, EPA officials stressed the necessity of differentiated 
training strategies and emphasized the effect of transformation of American 
patterns through the contact with European contexts. Actually it was precisely 
during his trip to the US in 1955, that King became aware that the case method 
approach was not the unique method to be adopted in the US and that particular 
attention “should be given to the newer American experiments in this field and to 
the work of specialist groups on the social and industrial engineering fringe of the 
subject, rather than that of the traditional schools even where they are 
successful.”!? 389
38 According to FF’s reports 350 European professors studied in the US under EPA’s 
programs 190 following the long courses, 160 following the short courses (6 weeks to 4 
months)[FFA n° Reel 0527, PA 57-265, Section 3, Caracciolo Letter to Gordon, 28-2-1962],
39 UM, j.nr. 106.P.11, pk 2, C( 50) 40 20.2, 1956, quoted by B. Boel, “The European 




























































































The extension of the original problem related to productivity drive was associated 
to a perception that management development activities should have a new focus: 
the major objective was to bridge applied economics and industry and to develop 
interdisciplinary strategies.» In a memorandum of November 7, 1957, Joseph 
Slater stated that,
“much of this activity has been focused around the creation of schools of business 
management in Europe and that the initial shortage of professors has been alleviated to 
some extent by EPA, by bringing American professors over, as well by training younger 
men at the assistant professor level from the faculties of economics, engineering and 
law. A possible development of this program could be supported through a Ford 
Foundation grant”.
EPA’s official Ottino Caracciolo observed however, that the influence of 
American teachers and methods was not a one way street and that in the new 
program it should also be considered the fact that, the influx of European 
professors has had an important influence on American business schools. For one 
thing, there was evidence that the case method at Harvard, which had tended in 
Europe to be regarded as the best method, was revealed to be only one among 
many good methods. Caracciolo also pointed out that US business schools “are 
becoming aware of the need for special training of their own students who are 
taking part in international business.”
Meanwhile one should consider that in different European countries there existed 
American experts, who had the same beliefs as Dunlap Smith, (the Dean of 
Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh), who had stressed the necessity, 
“that Norway should not copy methods that were used in the US to increase 
productivity issues’’̂  in his 1953 report on the relationship between higher 
education and business in Norway.
Foundation officers and EPA officials agreed that new programs should be related 
to a more general project to introduce in Europe new concepts arising from "the 401
the 1950’s”, to be published in T. Gourvish and N. Tiratsoo, Americanisation and its limits, 
Manchester University Press.
40 This orientation was strongly supported by FF officers, particularly by J. Slater, History o f 
the Ford Foundation’s International Affairs Program, December 3, 1965, pp. 49-56 [FFA 
Report n° 008727],
41 Rolv P. Amdam, The Role o f National Productivity Efforts and Regional Business Networks 
fo r  the Diffusion o f American Management Models in Norway during 1950's and 1960's. A 
Critical Reexamination o f "Mass Production ” as the Core o f Americanisation, Paper 





























































































impact of science and technology on economic; the drive for European 
integration; changed patterns in the world trade".
In the early Fifties the reconstruction of European economy was the foremost 
problem. EPA, therefore, transplanted from the US ideas and techniques which 
were readily applicable to European plants and industries. Essentially it was 
engaged in the dissemination of managerial techniques over a wide spectrum. 
Since the end of the Fifties, the European economy has been rebuilt to the pre­
war level. The new focus was on economic development rather than on the 
development of productivity techniques. This new orientation implied a shift also 
in the development of Ford Foundation’s grants to EPA activity. .
In the late Fifties EDA continued to make “classical” grants directed to 
productivity goals while the International Affairs Program developed an action 
directed to strengthen various academic and non academic centers and to the 
training of outstanding individuals, giving result to the development of “possible 
cooperation between EPA and the Foundation in economic development” and 
trying to integrate this cooperation within existing programs, like those developed 
in England (LSE and Nufflied College in Oxford)), in Italy (Spisa and Svimez and 
in Naples Rossi-Doria Center), in order to strengthen research and 
interdisciplinary strategies.
"Le souci de productivité reste vital pour l'Europe" -René Sergent, EPA's Secretary 
general wrote in July 1958- "mais il ne saurait pas être exclusif. A la phase de la 
reconstruction a succédé une phase de développement. L'objectif pour l'Europe est 
désormais de créer les conditions d'un progrès technique sans lequel le niveau de vie ne 
pourra être augmenté. Cela suppose des études et des expériences d'un niveau assez 
différent de celles entreprises jusqu’à présent. En fait, le programme de l'agence est, 
depuis deux ans, orienté dans ce sens./../: dans tous les domaines la formation a pris le 
pas sur l'information”.
This shift had its original and basic framework in the new orientation taken by 
EPA since 1956, through the activity of a small group of experts who "fancy" 
themselves as “intellectual entrepreneurs”. Their action implied, first of all, a 
stricter co-ordination between EPA's short-terms programs (which were in 
essence related to the activity of National Productivity Centres in developing a 
series of Executive Development seminars, of short duration, aimed at giving new 
knowledge and skills to executive holding posts of responsibility in numerous 
small and medium-sized enterprises) and the long-term program. It aimed at 
creating “a network of competent institutions in Europe and to exploit their 




























































































organize and execute development programs” «, rather than a central management 
association. The focus should therefore be placed not only in capital and 
technology but also in the implementation of human factors.
Different permanent institutions within and outside the University system would 
primarily supply the managers and entrepreneurs needed by expanding and 
integrating economies of the European member countries and secondly become 
centers of study and research for the application to European countries of the 
general theories of management developed in the United States.
Kermit Gordon, a Ford Foundation officer, also suggested in November 1957, 
that the new European business schools would be the natural centers for research 
in productivity.
Ford Foundation reports of this period stress that the point of crisis was 
principally related to a serious shortage, if not total absence, of suitable 
professors. At the same time EPA's officers and particularly Ottino Caracciolo di 
Fiorino, as mentioned before, pointed out that the flow of European professors 
trained by EPA's fellowships has had an important influence on American 
business schools.
This was the basic framework in which the synergetic support of the Ford 
Foundation to EPA's programs in management education took place in the late 
Fifties. Ford Foundation support was oriented towards a specific goal: financing 
fortwo years a program called "Pool of Professors in Management Education" 
with a grant of $98,000 in 1957 renewed in 1959. The strategic synergy with 
EPA was clearly stated: as supplying American professors whose double role 
consisted of conducting courses, as well as giving policy advice to the new 
institutions, staffing them with a body of competent assistants, generally those 
who have been trained by EPA's programs in the US.
The draft of the project presented in 1957 to the Ford Foundation by Roger 
Gregoire was clearly directed to improve management education by creating a 
good, permanent and research trained teaching staff. Gregoire wrote:
"The present project aims at overcoming part of the shortage of teachers of Business 
Administration in Europe. The EPA and other programs in this field have, in fact, 
resulted in the creation of numerous schools of business management, for which 
qualified professors are urgently needed. The EPA with considerable financial support 
from the United States International Cooperation Administration, is endeavouring to 
increase both the numbers and the quality of management teachers by means of its 42
42 Memorandum from Waldemar A. Nielsen to Shepard Stone Paris, June 27, 1959 [FFA 




























































































reaches training projects in the USA and in Europe; however, it must be recognised 
that demand has outstripped the availability, primarily because of the length of time 
required to train qualified personnel and steps must be taken if European management 
teaching is to develop as rapidly as desired."45
It was clear that the need for management teachers was deeply rooted in Europe 
during the late Fifties and was certainly strengthened by the European integration 
after the treaty of Rome. The economic expansion, which took place as a result of 
the European recovery, had a direct impact on private firms and, in particular, on 
small and medium-size enterprises.
One result of this growth in the size of the firms was to create a demand for a 
greater variety of specialised skills at the middle management level. The 
universities and other training institutions in Europe were not geared to provide 
individuals with these new fields of specialisation.
"In addition,"- Gregoire observed - "the fear of economic distortions, presumably to be 
caused by the integration of European economies, caused grave concerns to small and 
medium entrepreneurs, who were in fact the body of public opinion which most resisted 
the various plan of economic integration. In this way EPA not only helped to overcome 
the resistance but helped in creating an atmosphere in which change was welcomed as 
an opportunity rather than feared as a difficulty”.* 44
The Pool of Professors Program
The main goal of the pool of professor program was not only to create centres of 
studies and research in management, but also to supply the managers needs with 
expanding and integrated economies of the European member countries. It was 
the long-term program which captured the Ford Foundation’s attention. Ford 
Foundation's reply to EPA’s requirements was a positive one: in total the Ford 
Foundation grants allowed for the recruitment of 25 American professors. The 
interest in this program was strong; in 1958/59 alone, fifty management training 
institutes expressed their interest in receiving American guest professors through 
this program. The 25 professors came from different American institutions and 
from different areas of the U.S.A. but a large percentage came from Michigan. 
This was an important factor with respect to the insertion of marketing and 
organisational behaviour as teaching subjects in the new European school's 
curricula, considering that these disciplines were considerably developed both by 
Ann Arbor and the Chicago School of Business Administration.
45 [FFA Reel n° 05265, Section 1],




























































































As previously stated American professors had two main tasks: conducting 
courses as well as giving policy advice to the new institutions to set them off in 
the "right direction". This direction was of course related to the implementation of 
American standards which should create also a basic similarity among institutions 
disseminated in different countries. An important part of their work was also 
selecting young assistant professors who would receive a scholarship, (from 
different sponsors, including the Fulbright program which was well developed in 
many European countries since the early Fifties) to spend a one-year period in the 
United States during which they could specialise in a particular subject matter of 
business administration.
The evaluation of the background of the discussion of the goals of the FF grant to 
EPA is a very interesting account of the foundation general policy in this field:
"The development of business management training in European universities is 
considered to be important in terms of the objectives of the foundation's European 
program and in the program in Economic Development and Administration. Such 
training can contribute directly to strengthening the European economy and also have a 
direct effect on the structure, methods and orientation of European higher education. 
The encouragement of such professional schools in Europe, like the development of the 
social sciences generally, will help repair the broken link between European academic 
institutions and the pressing social, economic and political problems of the continent. 
Business management training has had rapid growth in post-war Europe and the 
problem at the moment is not only to encourage further growth but to keep it on a 
sound basis of competence and quality”45.
The Foundation's main goal was clearly to translate to Europe the basic patterns 
of American "organisational synthesis" rather than to simply export educational 
contents and teaching programs. Obviously, however, the possibility of 
developing this strategy largely depended on "contexts": in the countries where 
management (and not only management education) was still a no man’s land, as 
well as in the countries where there was still a great reluctance to accept 
management as a subject of sufficient intellectual and scientific content to be 
included into higher education system, this transfer was mainly centred on 
contents and programs.
Considering the problem of "contrast of contexts" within a rather diffused 
strategy of dissemination, like that of the Ford Foundation during the late Fifties 
and the early Sixties, it is interesting to note that the demand for American guest 
professors came mostly from countries in which management education had met





























































































serious obstacles in its process of institutionalisation, that is Italy (61%) and 
England (17,5%). Whereas the demand from other European countries emerged 
for another reason, the opportunity to introduce courses in English, such countries 
were; the Netherlands (15,5%), Sweden (5,%%) and Belgium (0,5%).
In Italy, especially at ISIDA in Palermo there was without doubt the highest 
concentration of American professors. It is evident that in its first three years of 
life (1956-1959) ISIDA profited from IPSOA's crisis, which was already evident 
since 1957, by obtaining the best American professors available. [Ezra Solomon 
from Stanford and Mervin Waterman from Ann Arbor School of Business 
Administration taught Finance and Controls; Joseph W. Towl from Washington 
University and for a short period also Pearson Hunt from Harvard University who 
taught General Management; Paul Converse from the University of Illinois and 
Edward Cundiff from the University of Texas taught Marketing, Norman Maier 
from Ann Arbor thought Industrial Relations and Psychological Research]. The 
reports of the American professors reveal that ISIDA’s experiment and the 
interest of its Director, Gabriele Morello, in research and in organising at the 
Institute a general management curriculum (strongly different from the Italian 
trade schools curricula) was considered a positive result. ISIDA was, in this 
period, a promising institution in the European context as was IPSOA at the 
beginning of the Fifties. This was also the case for CUOA in Padua.
“It is the first example I know in Italy of University action in this field. Most of the 
students will be men who already have a university degree in engineering /../ The case 
study method will be emphasized as well as the seminar method of instruction. If 
IPSOA had done nothing else, I think it helped lay the groundwork for this undertaking 
in Padua”, Waldemar Nielsen wrote in 1957.
Therefore, we can say that in the mid-Fifties, Italy was at the core of the 
American experiment of "exporting" management education to the old continent. 
The backwardness of Italy in this field was probably an element which facilitated 
an initial, rather mechanical transfer, which in a few years implemented its 
capabilities of adapting programs to an environment which was perceived as a 
dynamic one.. Actualy IPSOA was the first European business schools to 
develop, though for a short period, a permanent faculty The situation changed 
rapidly in the first half of the Sixties when the dissemination of management 
education in Europe created an increasingly relevant asymmetry among 
institutions and national cultural patterns.
Unfortunately Italy was characterised by a rapid process of involution (at the 




























































































sinistra” but also as a consequence of the social effect of an economic crisis 
which characterised the mid(static) Sixties.
"Under the bonanza of the much praised 'economic miracles’" -Gabriele Morello 
wrote-" the need for investments in human resources was not felt The number of 
executives who in the sixties went through regular learning exercises can be counted in 
terms of a few hundred per year One could ask why the new initiatives did not 
originate from the universities Historically, Italy was probably the first country to 
conceive the engineer as a man of vast and complex knowledge But the technician 
of general education, this Leonardian type of all-round figures, did not last long, soon 
be replaced, under the spurs of technological process by specialists. And thus it 
happened that /Italian/ faculties were divided into small bit and pieces of specialised 
sciences /and/ the Italian educational model was frozen into a monolithic system which 
kept adding new departments and disciplines while leaving unchanged the structure of 
the system /../. Since each small piece of science turned into a chair, meant status and 
personal gratification for somebody, the impetus for the citadels of knowledge to 
become citadels of power, was real and concrete"46.
Italy: the “enclosure” effect
There remains one other element which should be added to this lucid analysis. 
While in the largest part of the European countries a post-graduate studies' 
strategy and structure were rapidly developed in most of the disciplines, in Italy, 
despite the energy devoted in this direction by a small group of enlightened 
intellectuals and administrators, strongly supported by Ford Foundation programs, 
(COSPOS, SPISA, Portici Institute, SVIMEZ) nothing happened.47 A post­
graduate studies’ structure was created only at the beginning of the Eighties, as an 
extreme "rattrappage" in order to avoid complete exclusion from European 
educational standards.
Moreover the Italian system was characterized by a hybrid situation in which 
some "islands of innovation") coexisted (as a sort of enclosures, however) with 
persistence within the Faculties of Economics, dominated by the tradition of 
“Economia aziandale”, (which was closer to the German tradition of 
Betriebwirtshafslehre and business economics rather than to “business 
administration” patterns), of a strong theoretical approach based on the general
46 G. Morello Changing Organisations and the Role of Management Development, EFMD, 
Illrd Annual Conference Proceedings, Turin, 19-22 May 1974, pp.60-62.
47 For a systematic analysis of these programs see G. Gemelli, “The Ford Foundation and the 
Development of Social and Political Sciences in Italy (1954-1973)” in G. Gemelli (ed.), Big 
Culture. Intellectual Co-operation in Large-Scale Cultural and Technical systems, Bologna, 




























































































theory of the unity of the firm and on the separation between pure and applied 
economics.
Finally, as stated in the “Frederick report” of 1968 the diagnosis of possible 
implementation of management education in Italy was rather sceptical:
“Some twenty programs exist; only five can be considered nationally significant; and 
none compares favourably with the best business schools of other European Nations. 
Several features of the Italian economic, political, social, and cultural environment 
conspire to frustrate the steady and healthy growth of training institutions /../ Presently 
the business schools are faced with serious problems of staffing, lack of research, 
business and government apathy, hostility of traditional academic groups and 
professional rivalry among themselves /../ The history of management education in Italy 
is one that has featured an erratic up-and-down cycle of development of individual 
programs and schools./../ The Italians have built each of their management training 
institutions on the aspirations, drive talents, and community contacts of a single man. 
This man -usually the director- has founded the program /../ his ideas and philosophy 
usually dominated it and his personal interest and continued involvement are absolutely 
essential to the survival of the institution /../ Very little institutionalization has occurred. 
Consequently, those training efforts are vulnerable to the whims of all those social 
forces that act upon the careers of the program directors. More so than in most nations, 
the institution is the man. The man is very largely the institution” .
Frederick quoted extensively a 1965 OECD report, whose statement about the 
future sounds now as a fulfilled prediction:
‘The authorities confronted with a lowering of the general educational level of the 
managerial class in Italy have to deal with the question of development and renewal, the 
foundation for which must be laid between 1966 and 1975, although results will be felt 
only much later.”48
These considerations help to explain two sequences of events: firstly why Italy 
participated so intensively in the first phase of the Ford Foundation's international 
policies, but played an almost insignificant role in the second phase which was 
devoted to strengthening research and graduate-studies program rather than to 
simply export "American patterns" of training and education. Secondly, why the 
shift between the end of the Fifties and the mid-Sixties was so strong and evident 
especially in the relationships between the two sides of the Atlantic.
The development of new attitudes in American "cultural behaviour" basically 
oriented to a cross-fertilization policy, considering differences as well as 
similarities among countries and cultures, undoubtedly facilitated the already






























































































existent process of differentiation, in size and strategies, which characterized the 
development of the European business schools during the sixties. Actually the 
most visible "contrast of contexts" during this period depended on the asymmetry 
between the dynamic situation which characterized some European countries like 
France, Belgium and to some extent England (considering its basic “cultural- 
institutional’ resistance to management education’s development but also its 
strong tradition in social science research, through innovative institutions like the 
Tavistock Institute) and the Italian involution, which became evident at the end of 
the Sixties.
It was certainly supported by the consolidation of social factors, such as 
cohercitive authority, power and status which remained predominant both in the 
University system and among the managerial elite.
‘Technical, economic, financial, or managerial skill is considered less important than 
kinship relations/../."- Frederick stated- 'The result is a style of managing that is 
impermeable to rationality, inaccessible to all but a precious few, and unfathomable to 
those not closely acquainted with past and present family histories, social rivalries and 
political intrigues /../ The business and political practices are sufficiently intertwined/../ 
to make a major change in one sector difficult to achieve without serious upheavals in 
the other sectors.”49
Between Europeanization and Internationalization: INSEAD’ s origins
What should be stressed is that, despite many shifts produced by historical 
factors, a basic ground for the new trend which characterized Ford Foundation's 
policies in European educational programs during the Sixties, should be retraced 
to the previous experimental phase, as described above. The “stream of actions” 
of this phase, progressively corrected and adapted to different environmental 
contexts, the idea of simply exporting American methods and patterns.
The reports which professors, engaged in the EPA's program, wrote on the 
situation of the schools they visited were precious instruments for the Ford 
Foundation both in defining its policy of investments in each country, with respect 
to the level of acceptance of management education at university, and in selecting 
the projects which had a priority in the Foundation’s general policy. Moreover, 
one should consider the role of EPA in supporting the creation of INSEAD, the 
first European business school, in cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce in 
Paris, and with the agreement of industrialists like Raoul de Vitry, from Pechiney, 
and the president of Saint Gobain de Vogue, in fostering European training 





























































































Furthermore, EPA supported the creation of the European Liaison Committee for 
Management Education Development with the purpose of stimulating the 
interaction between its members, which were the EAMTC, the IUC, the CECIOS 
and the FEACO. Many of the reports produced by the EPA advisory service and 
in particular the so-called Platt report, published in 1963 by a group of 
outstanding scholars including, Platt, Gaston Berger (replaced by P. Huvelin 
when he died) and Pierre Tabatoni, played an important role in the subsequent 
development of Ford Foundation design for Western Europe management 
education.
However, at the end of the Fifties, when the time of EPA was over, and the Ford 
Foundation went alone to the European arena, the agenda had changed. The focus 
was no longer on security problems and productivity drive but rather on the idea 
that cooperation strategies could implement the development of an equal 
partnership between the two continents and that the policy of science could be a 
strategic weapon in fostering East-West relations. One of the main elements of 
this shift was certainly the multiplier effect produced by European integration 
after the treaty of Rome, which is particularly evident in the French case, 
especially in the origins of INSEAD.
When INSEAD started its classes the French industrial and institutional 
environment was almost as inhospitable as the Italian one. The University system 
and above all the system of the grandes ecoles had the monopoly of higher 
education, even in commercial studies. Since 1881, in fact, the Ecole of Hautes 
Etudes Commerciales have been in existence and developing in France and have 
developed strong roots within the entrepreneurial elite's social milieu. Until the 
Second World War and even later, the French entrepreneurial environment was 
dominated by middle and little enterprises which had a low interest in MBA 
programs. Similar to the Italian case the engineering schools tradition was 
dominated by the production-engineers, well accustomed to taylorist gospel but 
rather unaware of new approaches50.
Nevertheless, unlike their Italian colleagues at IPSOA, INSEAD's pioneers could 
count on some opportunities which they were able to exploit at the point of 
transforming what appeared as an obstacle in an additional impetus. An important 
opportunity was created by the process of cross-fertilization, realized by the CPA 
whose methods and training patterns were assimilated by a large range of 
students who came from the most different institutions and who, later on, had 
different careers not only in the industrial milieu but also in bureaucracy, finance,
50 On this point see Bruce R. Scott Letter to Mariam Chamberlain, July 8, 1968 and the paper 




























































































diplomacy. An excellent example of this process of "horizontal fertilization" of 
different social and institutional segments is that of Pierre Uri, a former CPA 
student who became head of the Commissariat au plan. As stated before, in 
order to resist the University system's opposition, IPSOA progressively 
transformed itself into a kind of "innovation enclosure" with lower and lower 
relationships with the entrepreneurial and the academic environment. On the 
contrary, INSEAD's founders, developing General Doriot's orientation, tried to 
consolidate a large network of supporters and donors not only in France but also 
in Europe and in the United States.
It should be noted that in the university milieu the resistance of some sectors was 
compensated by the behaviour of some actors, who, like the Director of the 
“Enseignement supérieur” Gaston Berger, played a crucial role in educational 
policies. In a memorandum of December 30, 1957, Waldemar Nielsen observed 
that:
“Berger is warmly in support of the business schools development, not only for its own 
sake but because of the invigorating effect such schools will have on French schools 
generally. He showed no trace of the snobbish and disrespectful attitude about business 
schools which is often encountered among European academicians. His support does 
not stop with general endorsement and he is now working on further specific steps to 
strengthen the business schools movement in France".
One should not forget that a few years before, in 1954, he had strongly supported 
the idea of creating (within the University system, but with a high level of 
autonomy under the formula of Faculty Institutes), the Institutes d’Administration 
des Enterprises. The design of this kind of institution came from a young graduate 
of the Faculty of Law, Pierre Tabatoni who in 1954 had just completed his 
training in the Untied States, at Harvard University, where by chance, he met 
General Doriot and came back to France carrying the fascinating impetus of 
Doriot’s ideas about strengthening European management education. Despite 
some reservations on the idea of creating a European Business school which he 
considered premature, Berger was not totally against the idea of INSEAD and did 
not try to stop plans for the new school, considering it as an element of a 
developing system.
In any case INSEAD did not depend on the University system and never tried to 
be accepted within it. It developed instead as an independent school and found 
the financial basis of its existence not only in the Chamber of Commerce and 
EPA support, but also in an increasing way in the entrepreneurial environment. 
This element also marks a crucial distance vis-à-vis the American Business 
Schools' organizational patterns, which in most cases, depended on the 




























































































development was created, in the short term, by a rapidly changing political 
situation, characterized at the international level by the implementation of 
European unification which implied at its ground the strengthening of an 
intellectual (and virtually political) identity.
At the national level INSEAD could profit of the effects of Mendés-France policy 
whose main orientation was to create a solid and dynamic interface between the 
public sector and the private sector, between the bureaucratic system and the 
entrepreneurial milieu. Unfortunately this orientation, despite the effort of an 
enlightened group of reformers, was totally lacking in Italy. INSEAD could profit 
also of some socio-cultural changes like the emergence of a new generation of 
poly-technicians trained as “ingégnieurs-économistes” who developed a process 
of sceintification of applied economics through operational analysis and 
mathematical models which was very close to the intellectual and scientific 
patterns of the “new paradigm” in American management sciences.
The new generation of ingénieurs-economistes could act as industrialists in the 
private sector as well as experts in the State Administration. Significantly the 
young founders of INSEAD, Olivier Giscard d’Estaing, Roger Godino, and 
Claude Jansenn were all polytechnicians trained as ingénieurs-économistes with 
Maurice Allais and later on at Harvard, with Doriot. INSEAD could therefore, 
profit from the opportunity created by the intellectual and the social capital of the 
founders who developed a good knowledge of the American educational patterns 
(including the case method). All these basic factors undoubtedly facilitated the 
relationships with the most important American business schools, (Harvard, 
Stanford and Columbia) and also the placement of young graduates in American 
firms and multinationals, exactly during the period in which European expansion 
was at the top. Then it is not surprising that INSEAD was one of the first 
business schools to take advantage of the Ford Foundation’s interest in 
developing a European program.
The first request to the Foundation was made as early as 1959 by the first 
president of the Institute, Postumus Meyjés who contacted Thomas H. Carroll 
and presented a request for a conspicuous grant of $2,200,000 with the following 
purposes :
a) carrying out additional Research and Case Development on the various aspects 
of the Common Market’s evolution and the impact this and any further steps 
toward European Economic Integration would have both within and outside of the 
Common Market Area;
b) to attract and hold high calibre faculty from both Europe and the US;
c) to develop and keep up to the best international library in Europe, and




























































































INSEAD founders’ expectations were certainly disillusioned when the IA staff 
decided to make a grant of $120,000, which basically respected the aims of the 
Ford Foundation’s programs in this area “to provide modest support to help 
stimulate cooperation in international management, training and research.” 
Requests by the Institute for the large-scale support of the Foundation were 
rejected on the grounds that European industry was in a position to provide its 
basic operational needs. A relevant goal of the grant was “to stimulate co­
operative arrangements with other European management training centers and 
institutes, developing teaching materials on European and International 
management problems and provide a limited number of fellowships to highly 
qualified non French students who /were/ likely to become teachers of business 
management in their respective countries”. It is interesting to observe that the 
grant’s target contains, on a “small scale”, most of the relevant goals which 
became crucial in the late sixties as large scale policies. Furthermore, the limited 
amount of the grant was among the factors which stimulated the growing 
interaction of INSEAD with the business environment, through an increasing 
offering of “tailor- made” research projects, which in the long run became a 
factor of institutional competitiveness and a way to capture new grants from the 
Ford Foundation, when its “grand design” for Europe, grounded on 
professionalization of management through research started.
As Roger Godino stated in 1965, at a seminar held by INSEAD in cooperation 
with Harvard Business School and the McKinsey Foundation on Research 
Policies and Development, Technological Change and their International 
Effects, the possible solution for the increasing gap between US and Europe, 
“will be found when big US concerns stop taking their political lead solely from 
Washington and, as the importance of national control declines, help from one big 
borderless business block in the Western hemisphere”. This orientation met the 
basic goal of IA programs in a period in which strategic priorities were related to 
the necessity of bypassing national limitations to strengthen Atlantic Partnership. 
In their first application to the Ford Foundation, Olivier Giscard d’Estaing and 
Postumus Meyjes stressed that the development of INSEAD could be a relevant 
element “towards the conclusion of a wider North-Atlantic business community 
consistent with European goals” and that “it is a great opportunity that such a 
project is started in business administration, both because it will be a very 
efficient tool in forcing the unity of Europe and because it maintains and 
encourages Europe in a free enterprise system”.
Significantly, from the side Ford Foundation, Joseph Slater seemed to catch the 




























































































“Why not /../ propose a fluid fund research grant for 1NSEAD?. The confidence in the 
institution would appear to justify such a grant and to warrant the assumption that they 
would design a research program more in keeping with the INSEAD mission. For 
example why not research on some of their multinational constituents, such as 
UNILEVER, ICI, Royal Dutch, Air France, Olivetti.”
The second grant ($150,000), made by the Ford Foundation to INSEAD in 1965 
within the Harvard Business Schools’ International Teacher Program, reveals 
however the “Janus like” orientation of the Fontainebleau institute. In one year 
INSEAD teaching staff were able to detect the elements of weakness of the 
Harvard-Ford program, starting a campaign for the Europeanization of the 
program. In a memorandum sent by R. Catalano to J. Slater in June 1966 is was 
clearly stated that:
“The joint research (primarily case collection) program with Harvard, is not as good as 
it should be. Professor Mace - Business policy- and Smith- Finance- have used the 
program to gather case material, related to their particular research interest of primary 
benefit to their courses at Harvard /../. The case collection of Hansen- in marketing- has 
been much more useful to INSEAD. This is because he and Teresi worked closely 
together and planned the case collection to fit the needs of the School’s marketing 
course.” 51
This was the first of a series of several complaints which prepared a revision of 
the ITP program and finally resulted in the creation of a European Consortium, 
with the implementation of training methods which exceeded the Harvard case 
method.
One should note that the impact of ITP programs had different effects in different 
European institutions, according to the size and development of each school. For 
INSEAD the new orientation of ITP programs represented an important step in 
developing its role as the central institution in Europeanization processes which is 
clearly stated in a letter of Dean Berry’s to Marshall Robinson:
“The design of the ITP program is a rigid immersion course in the Harvard theology. I 
certainly don’t regard this at all bad but it does lead to a substantially different focus 
than the Europeans, collectively, feel they are after. The Europeans feel that it should 
be a program to train teachers. They do not think, for example, that everyone who 
attends the program should necessarily sit through every functional area and all the 
cases. They do feel that the program should stress how to teach and not to be a 
sanforized shrunk version of the MBA curriculum at Harvard. It became evident in our




























































































last meeting that as long as Harvard controls the funds they are going to control the 
staffing and detailed planning of the course.”52
In Italy, where a new trend in management education development was just 
starting, after the static period of the Sixties, with the creation of SDA- Bocconi 
and ISTUD, the ITP program as well as the creation of a case method 
clearinghouse were relevant factors of the Americanisation of many sectors of 
European management education. Bocconi’s faculty largely depended on the 
SDA program, the young assistants who wanted to become professors were all 
under obligation to participate to an ITP.
The creation of the European Consortium in 1969 was not only the result of the 
perception that the Harvard Faculty was not sufficiently international in its 
outlook, but of several factors which included that “the calibre of participants 
varied greatly from brilliant to incompetent” and that there was a perception of a 
basic lack of structure within the ITP, (ITP participants attending Harvard 
Business School classes were frequently unprepared in comparison to the 
majority). Moreover the new dean, Larry Fouraker thought that times had 
changed and that spreading the Harvard message through professors circulating in 
different schools and national areas “could no longer be seen as a clear-cut 
benefit”53.
From Harvard Business School’s perspective the focus turned to the idea of 
creating, at Mount Pellerin in Switzerland, a European based counterpart to the 
Advanced Management program at Harvard Business School. No doubt, however 
INSEAD’s resistance and, primarily the large grant that the Institute received by 
the Ford Foundation, had a role in changing Harvard Business School’s 
orientation. One should stress here, that since 1964 the Ford Foundation had 
manifested a strong interest in developing international business programs and 
made a conspicuous grant of $12,5 million to Harvard and $10,9 million to 
Columbia for international studies under the EDA program “EDA saw these 
business schools of the potential leaders among US business schools for the 
development of research and curricula about international business, a field of 
growing importance in business education.”54
52 Dean F. Berry, Letter to Marshall A. Robinson, 2nd May, 1973, p.2 [FFA Reel n.24 Grant 
n° 6772, section 4],
53 One ITP’s history see S. Heptonstall, Faculty development: the International Teachers 
Program: a Case Study, CFSM /INTERMAN, 1991, pp.3-4 who however reduces the 
complexity of the transition from the “Harvard ITP” to the European consortium to a simple 
agreement between European business schools and HBS Faculty.





























































































INSEAD’s reaction to the “old Harvard Business School’s programs” and later 
on to the Mount Pellerin experiment were certainly useful to the Ford 
Foundation’s staff in defining the rationale of the grant to Harvard Business 
School. A letter of Marshall Robinson’s to Dean George Lombard of April 1972 
is very clear on this point. While Robinson underlined the necessity of a central 
clearing house for case method development. He also stressed Ford Foundation’s 
strong endorsement of efforts to Europeanize the knowledge, norms and people 
of American business schools,
“but not by locating the schools in Europe. Thus" -Robinson suggested- "I hope our 
involvement with the case workshop and clearinghouse and with ITP will continue to 
foster creative learning experiences and research opportunities for your Faculty; and I 
hope that it will not be viewed as support for those who would open up a branch office 
in EEC. Finally let me note that 1 hope you will make every effort to keep a healthy 
distance between this effort and the idea of an HBS institutional presence in Europe.”55
Ford Foundation behaviour vis-à-vis Harvard Business School had also a strategic 
effect in strengthening INSEAD visibility in the arenas of international business 
operations and research.Actually the growth of this “Janus like” orientation in 
INSEAD institutional development between Europeanization and 
Internationalization was directly and indirectly related to relevant crucial changes 
which occurred simultaneously both within the Foundation’s internal staff and 
programs and in the European environment of the mid Sixties. One should 
consider the fact that EPA stopped its activities and that, despite a series of 
reports related to different countries published in 1965, OECD did not take the 
release of EPA’s activities in management education. One should also consider 
the fact that in the early Sixties the American congress felt that European 
countries had reached the stage when they should provide to support themselves 
and American business was reluctant to give further assistance to possible 
competitors. Paradoxically, the most relevant effects of the Marshall plan became 
evident in the early and mid-Sixties.
“It may be argued that while the Marshall Plan was a one time, fixed-duration event, its 
significance lies not so much in its short-term economic results as in its long-terms 
impact.”56
55 Marshall A. Robinson Letter to Dean George F. Lombard, April 3, 1972[FFA, Reel n° 1542 
Grant n° 71197, section 4] The project to develop case method and to create a clearinghouse 
started in 1972 with a grant of$ 300,000. Initially coordinated by Andrew Towl, Director of 
Case Development and the Intercollegiate Case Clearing House at Harvard, it continued after 
1974 under European auspices.
561. Wexler, The Marshall Plan and the Beginning o f the Cold War: Diplomatic History in 




























































































The Marshall plan embedded the stream of actions of some of the actors involved 
in EPA-Ford Foundation cooperation in the late Fifties and produced, as 
mentioned before, a kind of epsilon effect which cross-fertilized Ford 
Foundation’s policies after the end of the European reconstruction era. Some of 
these actors, (like Alexander King, Roger Gregoire and Joseph Slater), 
unconsciously anticipated elements of the crucial shift from security strategies as 
basic factors of productivity policies during the first phase of the Cold War to 
development policies, not only in terms of economic development but also in 
terms of research strategies and cultural-scientific development, which became 
relevant factors during the Sixties and the early Seventies.
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